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Abstract 
 
This paper is called ‘Specific gravity’ because it wants to suggest that there 
is a deep import, a weight, a gravitas to the specific details of ordinary 
cultural practices. It is in four sections. 
  The first opens up the perennial question ‘What is culture?’. It 
considers this question in terms of how it may or may not be answered, 
drawing on Wittgenstein’s remarks against essentialism, and on (as with 
Wittgenstein) anecdotes from everyday experiences and their logical 
consequences. Some comparisons between this outline and two recent 
contributions to cultural history are then made to set the scene for the 
promised alternative. 
  The second section deals with sheer ordinariness as an analytically 
complex phenomenon. It draws on the work of Alfred Schütz and Harvey 
Sacks to show how the often-missed ordinariness of everyday affairs may 
be the key topic for understanding and analysing culture. 
  The next section goes a little further into this same — routinely 
overlooked, perhaps because so obvious — territory by rehearsing an 
example from one of Sacks’s lectures on the everyday cultural practice of 
‘tearing down’. It attempts to draw a distinction between lay and 
professional analysis that could give cultural analysis a disciplinary footing 
without resorting to ‘positivism’ and/or the view that lay reasoning is 
inferior to its scientific counterparts. 
  Finally, in the fourth section, I deal with a collection of textual 
materials, all of which mobilise the term ‘culture’ and the concept of 
culture for specific moral purposes. The paper concludes with some 
hypotheses about ordinary, everyday uses of the idea of culture and how 
they might be worked with (or on) to form the basis of an alternative 
specification of culture. 
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1. Asking the question 
 
‘What, after all that then, is culture?’ This is a question that was routinely put to 
me by one or more students at the end of a course I taught for many years until 
quite recently. The course was H303 Cultural History (earlier, Cultural Theory) 
and, in its various guises, it took students through a brief genealogy of the 
concept of culture as it emerges in modernity: starting with its ur-forms in Hobbes 
and Vico, running through the enlightenment and reactions to it in the works of 
Herder and the post-Kantian Romantics; eventually arriving, via Comte, at the 
20th century and the emergence of cultural studies itself. So many different 
positions, so many answers to the question.i In this paper, I want to try to work 
out how we might think about the question — what is culture? — in some non-
mainstream ways, and then to suggest and illustrate a kind of analytic method. 
 
Questions of the ‘what is...’ variety do, it is true, have a tendency to become the 
province of philosophy. Still our question — what is culture? — need not be 
philosophical, at least not in any card-carrying sense. It could even be a quite 
banal question — the sort of thing that could be talked about by pretty much 
anyone over a cup of tea perhaps, or a glass of beer. The question of culture, we 
might say, could be a popular question: a ‘popular cultural’ question even. But if 
it were, we might be begging the question again. So is there a way that the 
‘culturalness’ of the concept of culture could be raised as a serious question, 
avoiding vicious circles and embracing virtuous spirals? I think there may be and 
we could begin to see this by reflecting on an ordinary everyday event. 
 
Just popped down to the bottle shop (off-licence, liquor store ... take your 
culturally-specific pick) and, knowing Mick the proprietor well — after all I 
probably put his kids through private school — asked him straight out: what’s 
culture? He paused a while for thought. Then his offsider came in to tell him the Specific gravity / 3 
weeks a certain band would be playing at their pub (every Tuesday and every 
other Wednesday, as it happens). He jotted this down, matter-of-factly, found me 
a couple of bottles of Cooper’s Stout, and asked me to ask the question again. 
‘What’s culture’, I asked again, ‘what sort of thing is culture?’ More pausing, 
checking the computer for, he said, a big sale last week. Then a headshake. Then: 
‘Buggered if I know, Al. Probably, um, ballet and opera and art galleries and 
other shit they subsidise out of my taxes’. 
 
I was pushing the limits of my welcome — after all two 750ml bottles of Cooper’s 
only comes to about $11 — but went on: so what would a culture be? ‘That’s 
easy’, he said, no pause, snapping straight back, ‘Italian, Greek, Portuguese ... 
they’re all cultures. Different languages, card games, food, wine ... that stuff’. I 
nodded. He went on. ‘You wanna see what they ask for some nights: Lambrusco, 
Grappa, some grandmother’s drink they mix with milk I forgot the name of. Shit, 
I gotta keep everything. Imports: now there’s a problem with the stock...’. Mick 
continued in this vein for quite a while. 
 
So the question of what culture is can indeed be quite ordinary. And, in the case 
of the reported conversation, it was. But, even though it was ordinary, it wasn’t 
without difficulty. Difficulty can be ordinary, and ordinariness can be difficult. To 
get ahead of ourselves: ordinariness can take some seriously complex ‘doing 
being’.ii 
 
On reflection, I realised why my question to Mick was, in effect, two questions. 
When I asked him about culture, he had no idea at first, then came up with some 
concrete instances: ballet, opera and art galleries. When I asked him about a 
culture (or cultures), he had no hesitation. So let’s put a heuristic in place as I ask 
you to think along with me: ‘Culture’ (with a cap.) will be the topic of my first 
question, while ‘culture(s)’ (with a small-c) will be what I was asking about in the Specific gravity / 4 
second question. The latter, to be sure, is much more specific; though perhaps, as 
we shall see, nowhere near specific enough for our eventual needs. 
 
If our everyday experience at the bottle shop is anything to go by, it seems we’re 
dealing with two different but related things. As it happens, basic linguistics has a 
way of making the distinction. The distinction is between mass and count nouns 
and it’s critically important to sense-making in quite a few European languages. A 
way of telling the difference between the two in English is to ask whether the 
noun in question takes ‘many’ or ‘much’ as its qualifier. ‘Motorbike’ is a count 
noun because we say ‘many motorbikes’ and not ‘much motorbike’. ‘Cement’ is a 
mass noun because we say ‘much cement’ and not (or rarely) ‘many cements’. The 
obverse test is the dwindling distinction between ‘less’ and ‘fewer’; dwindling 
because we now hear such things as ‘there are less motorbikes on the road than 
there used to be’. 
 
However, the noun ‘culture’ can be found on both sides of the mass/count divide. 
Much culture? Many cultures? Less culture? Fewer cultures?: they’re all 
grammatical. But the same could be said of another popular cultured product: 
cheese. Some nouns like ‘cheese’ and ‘culture’ can swivel between mass and 
count. Much cheese. Many cheeses. Less cheese. Fewer cheeses. 
 
‘Much cheese’ makes no distinction between Edam and Camembert. There’s just a 
lot of it — a mass of humanly cultivated bovine abjection. ‘Many cheeses’ makes a 
definite distinction: a specific sample is either Cheddar or it’s Brie ... or something 
else entirely. I suspect it is this distinction, or lack of it, that is leading us, at least 
in part, into difficulty and, as is often the case, a return to ordinary language 
might lead us out of it. 
 
So why might an ordinary speaker of the language — like Mick in our example — Specific gravity / 5 
have a partial problem with Culture (mass) and no such problem with 
culture/cultures/a culture (count)? The same problem arises in another context: 
Wittgenstein’s (1958: § 89) response to abstraction and essentialism. He wonders 
why philosophers ask questions like ‘What is time?’ If you don’t ask me, I know 
perfectly well. As soon as you do ask me, I’m stumped.iii We could also add that 
there is no such problem with a question like ‘What’s the time?’ or with 
Wittgenstein’s own example: ‘What is the specific gravity of hydrogen?’ But as 
soon as we ask ‘What is...?’ in the sense of ‘What is ... essentially?’ or ‘What is ... in 
general’ we can get into deep water. And this seems to be especially true for those 
abstract concepts that are routinely expressed as mass nouns.iv And yet there 
need be no problem of essentialism vis-à-vis a question like ‘What is culture?’, 
providing we don’t ask the question in quite this way: expecting, perhaps, an 
answer in the form of a definition reaching to the ‘essence’ of culture ‘in general’. 
This might be a first way of responding to our H303 student, then: yes, the 
question is okay so long as it doesn’t send us on a wild-goose chase towards non-
existent essences. 
 
That is, we might go back and ask what sort of thing Wittgenstein knows when he 
says that he knows what time is (if he is not specifically asked about it). From the 
rest of his later work, we might infer that what he knows is not a species of 
‘knowing that’ (which steers us towards the essence of a thing) but of ‘knowing 
how’ (which turns us instead to the question of what it is possible for someone to 
do).v The ordinary person (as opposed, perhaps, to some kinds of philosophers) 
knows what time is because he or she operates with time in pretty much the same 
way as everyone else. Time is an operational sort of a thing; we have certain 
practices with time such as telling the time, timing an egg boiling, setting a clock, 
making an appointment for Friday week and so forth. 
 
Mick and his offsider have no problems with the idea that the band will play in Specific gravity / 6 
their pub every Tuesday and every other Wednesday at 7:30. They know what 
time is in the sense that they know how to operate with matters like ‘every 
Tuesday’, ‘every other Wednesday’ and ‘at 7:30’. And the test (should we require 
one) of their knowledge is not to ask them ‘What is time?’ and record their 
answers. Rather, the test is to see whether or not, for example, they set up the 
stage and the PA on the right evenings so that the band can come on at 7:30. 
 
The same applies, though perhaps in a slightly more peculiar way, to the concept 
of culture. I say ‘in a peculiar way’ because another way of putting the question of 
time would be to say that, as a practical operational matter, time is cultural. By 
analogy, then, it may not be completely absurd to say that the problem with the 
question ‘What is culture?’ is that culture, like time, is cultural. Indeed, we know 
perfectly well that the concept of culture itself varies between one ‘culture’ and 
another; even to the point where there may well be folks in the world that we 
(who have this concept) call ‘cultures’ who do not, endogenously, have such a 
concept. One example of such a thing would be most European ‘cultures’ before 
the Renaissance which marked not only a flowering of cultural things (such as art, 
science and literature) but also an initial seeding of the concept of culture itself 
which would come into full blossom only as late as the eighteenth century. Hence 
it is a gross anachronism — as Heidegger reminds us — to refer to such things as 
‘ancient Greek culture’.vi 
 
So, at least today and in some parts of the world (but not all), to operate with the 
concept of culture is a decidedly cultural matter. And if we happen to be 
interested in culture, for whatever reasons, it might even be the cultural matter. 
(Which is why I began with the view that the question ‘What is culture?’ may be a 
perfectly ordinary question rather than a purely, or even an impurely, 
philosophical question.) Yet this statement, in another sense, appears to take our 
investigation no further. It looks on the surface like a definition containing Specific gravity / 7 
reference to what is to be defined: again the question seems to be begged. But do 
we have to read it this way? Do we have to read it as a definition at all? For, have 
we not already seen that the question may not be one of the sort that calls for a 
definition — for example, of the ‘essence’ of a ‘thing’? On another model, the 
statement that culture is cultural may be perfectly meaningful, non-circular and 
far from tautological. Allow me to illustrate with another everyday experience. 
 
Some time ago, I was at a ‘popular theatre’ event; though I have reservations 
about using the word ‘drama’ in this context. It was held in a room in a pub and it 
was supposed to depict pub life from the perspective of a landlord, landlady and 
their customers (all of whom were played by the same two actors). There is 
nothing circular or tautological here in saying that pub life could be seen in the 
pub. And an incident just prior to the performance illustrates this just as well. 
 
The room in which the play was to be performed was (strangely enough) filling 
up to capacity — maybe our two actors had large families? — and yet there were 
still people outside holding tickets. One such refusé complained to the front-of-
house staff that ‘There’s no room in the room’. The utterance is perfectly 
straightforward. No one could possibly have a problem understanding it. The 
first ‘room’ is a mass noun; the second is count. And the same goes for ‘pub life’ 
and ‘the pub’. 
 
Ditto ‘culture is a cultural matter’. We can be, on this account, actually informed 
in a practical way about the sort of matter we are dealing with vis-à-vis culture. 
The statement is, then, not a definition in the form of an analytic proposition (like 
‘All bachelors are unmarried’) but rather a fragment of historically-specific 
information in the form of a synthetic proposition (like ‘Wittgenstein was a 
bachelor’). So how can we unpack this statement — one whose apparent 
obviousness may conceal important information — so as to bring out its Specific gravity / 8 
significance for anyone who might want to understand and analyse culture? 
 
Before we can get to our first approximation, it needs to be said that our 
transformed question — why is the culturality of culture an important step on the 
way to understanding what culture is? — is by no means a new one. Although 
Vico in the early 18th century did not have a concept of culture as such (indeed, 
this was not to arrive in its modern sense until Herder, much later in the same 
century), he knew fully well that what he then called ‘institution building 
wisdom’ (knowledge of how to make what we might now call cultural objects) 
was itself a cultural matter. Although the origin of this ‘wisdom’ lay in divine 
Providence — God had designed us as self-designing entities — it took on 
different manifestations in different locations. The many different and distinct 
human languages (invented by human beings but still based on the 
Providentially-given ground of a universal lingua mentalis) provide Vico with 
just one example. Other examples were laws, and customs such as religion, 
marriage and burial. Hence Vico’s early slogan for the culturality of culture itself, 
verum ipsum factum: we may only truly know what we ourselves have made. 
 
Without examining each stage of this idea along its (sometimes continuous, 
sometimes discontinuous) path to our own times, we can simply note that it is 
very much with us today in the work of late modern cultural historians. For the 
sake of comparison and contrast with what I’m proposing here (in terms of 
culture’s own culturality), I will briefly mention two examples. 
 
The first is what might be called the weak (or social constructionist) thesis and the 
example I have in mind is Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex, subtitled Body and 
Gender from the Greeks to Freud (1990). It marks, in some ways, what is radically 
different between Vico’s doctrine (or ‘study principle’ as he called it) and its late 
modern incarnation in social constructionism. For while Vico’s verum ipsum Specific gravity / 9 
factum meant that only humanly constructed (‘synthetic’ or ‘man-made’) objects 
could be the true objects of a science (scienza) — such that, for example, cultural 
history would be a genuine science while biology would be mere speculation 
(coscienza) about God’s own creation — Laqueur wants to extend the doctrine 
precisely to the latter: biology and, in particular, the biology of the sexed body. In 
effect, what the human body is (for example, a one-sexed body for some cultures 
and times, a two-sexed body for others) becomes an effect of the available cultural 
discourses on it or about it. From ancient Greece to the Renaissance, the idea of 
the one-sexed body — the view that male and female genitalia were essentially 
identical, if differently placed — was common but did not derive from anatomical 
observation. Rather it arose from particular cultural needs and requirements: 
especially concerning the political utility of regarding woman as a mere (and 
sometimes inferior) variation on man. And, not surprisingly, Laqueur makes a 
similar argument for the later (modern) two-sex model. What is behind all this is 
not scientific observation, rather it is ‘cultural work’ (1990: 151), at all times and 
places. 
 
It is not hard to see how this may well be an example of the culturality of culture 
thesis being set to work weakly or tautologically — the very thing, we saw above, 
any such theory must try to avoid. The biological body is assumed from the outset 
to be cultural (that is, ‘socially constructed’) — rather than natural, and therefore 
not subject to strict scientific analysis (in the modern rather than Vichian sense). 
Accordingly, whatever a Galen or a Freud may have to say about it must 
necessarily be the effect of ‘cultural work’ rather than strict scientific 
investigation. The vicious circle is not hard to discern.vii 
 
By contrast, Mary Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact, subtitled Problems of 
Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (1998) takes a much more 
measured position on the culturality of culture. Poovey has no doubt that there Specific gravity / 10 
are social scientific facts, however they may be derived. There are, among other 
things, hard numbers out there mapping on (as best as possible) to real states of 
affairs. Unlike Laqueur, Poovey has no interest in showing that, with the wisdom 
of late-modern hindsight, past thinkers can be shown (in fact?) to have been, all 
along, serving cultural-political demands rather than contributing to exact human 
sciences. It is no surprise, pace Laqueur, that facts are made: the very word ‘fact’ 
itself derives from facere, to do or to make; a fact just is a making or a deed. 
 
So Poovey’s question is a much more archaeological one: what was to be done 
with facts; what was their utility; how were they deployed; what social and 
cultural status did they have? Facts can stand alone, like bald assertions of 
putative empirical truths; Poovey calls them ‘epistemological units’. But they are 
also collected together into ensembles (and occasionally theories). Here they 
become ‘cultural configurations’, as they are pressed into service towards 
particular social, cultural and political ends. And, indeed, an important part of 
Poovey’s argument is that the history of the modern fact is a history of attempts 
to resolve this dual status of the fact — as stand-alone unit or as contributor to a 
more general configuration. 
 
So to take, for example, facts as cultural objects — and there are many things 
besides facts that might be so treated — need not involve the circularity of social 
constructionism. It is not at odds with empirical, archaeological investigations of 
cultural utility: with the analysis and understanding of how things get done on a 
day-by-day, event-by-event basis. Yet can we see, as it were, the work of this fact 
production in everyday bits of live cultural practice, here and now, and not just in 
the deep past?viii And can we see it in how the idea of (a) culture is mobilised in 
our own times? 
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2. The most ordinary thing in the world 
 
A perhaps neglected figure who broached this question in phenomenological 
terms was Alfred Schütz who made an important distinction between first and 
second order constructs (1962: 34-47). If we follow Schütz, we find that the idea of 
culture being cultural means, among other things, that culture is necessarily a 
second, not a first, order construct. Schütz noticed that natural scientists deal with 
constructs of the first order of interpretation The objects that the natural scientist 
has before her have not been interpreted until she herself — whoever — shows up 
on the scene. Atoms, planets and cyclones do not interpret themselves. (And, 
again pace Laqueur, neither do penises or clitorises as such.)ix However, as soon 
as we come to deal with human individuals or collectivities, we’re in a different 
situation entirely. These ‘objects of knowledge’ have interpreted themselves 
before any investigator comes on the scene. They are therefore ‘objects’ of the 
second order of interpretation. They come pre-interpreted — and so the job of 
anyone wanting to study culture is to interpret the interpretations that people 
have already made of themselves. Where complete human beings are concerned 
(as opposed to rats, atoms or penises), the investigator is always investigating 
‘second order’ matters. It is a fundamental category mistake, then, to treat 
humanly-produced things as ‘natural’ data; they are not data (givens) but capta 
(takens). (And, equally, it is a mistake to treat non-humanly-produced things as in 
any sense pre-interpreted.) 
 
When we presume to understand or analyse a cultural thing, we must realise that 
what the ‘folk’ (εθνοσ, ethnos) have already done with it (or ‘as’ it) is not stupid; it 
is not mere ‘folk knowledge’ as opposed, perhaps to hard social science. Actual 
persons have interpreted it, worked on it in methodical fashion. Stuart Hall is 
supposed to have been the first to insist that (against the much-maligned 
‘positivist’ social sciences) everyday actors are not ‘cultural dopes’. But the Specific gravity / 12 
critique of cultural-dopery originated with Garfinkel in Studies in 
Ethnomethodology (1967). Indeed, Garfinkel had (and still has) many things to 
say about how such an apparently gross thing as ‘culture’ might operate. And 
he’s not a million miles away from Schütz’s distinction between first and second 
order constructs when he does so. 
 
Accordingly, there’s a pretty obvious mistake that Schütz’s distinction can lead to. 
Let’s call it the mistake of positivism — while acknowledging that this is a terrible 
disservice to the actual, historical, popular, cultural and religious movement of 
Positivism itself.x The mistake is to think that second order constructs can be 
examined just as first order constructs can. We confuse the cultural analysis of 
fairs and furs with the analysis of (natural) firs: synthetic stuff comes to look just 
like natural stuff. The basic injunction is: don’t give in to physics envy! But there’s 
a second mistake that Schütz’s distinction can equally lead to: unless you accept 
that what you are ultimately doing is trying to get a description of actual cultural 
members’ interpretive practices, you will end up simply repeating those practices. 
There has to be some distinction between the analysis of cultural practice and its 
mere repetition: though the distinction, after Schütz and Garfinkel, cannot be a 
distinction between putatively (weak) folk-knowledge and (strong) formal 
scientific analysis. The cultural disciplines, in order to be disciplines at all, need a 
different distinction between their topics (cultural objects) and their resources 
(methods of analysis and understanding). How can we unearth such a thing? 
 
Harvey Sacks departs from Schütz when he replaces ‘interpretation’ with 
‘analysis’. It’s a bold move and it could even be a logical extension of the anti-
cultural-dope position that Hall borrowed from Garfinkel. Still, the radical idea is 
that members (e.g., Springsteen-, Pacino- or Buffy-fans) don’t merely consume 
records, films or TV programs as commodities; rather they are analysts of them in 
their own right. And their analyses are not only important (for understanding Specific gravity / 13 
what culture is) but more-or-less unrecorded. To get to an analytics that opened 
up this seen-but-unnoticed cultural stratum, Sacks proposed to collect ordinary 
everyday events (particularly conversations) and see if they could be understood 
as instances of members’ own methodical analyses. Sacks’s objective was to get a 
good description of the analytic ‘machinery’ members themselves use in doing 
ordinary things; like making a phone call, walking down the street, or cooking 
dinner. This distinguishes cultural analysis from cultural practice, to be sure, but, 
in line with Schütz’s distinction, it also leaves intact the integrity of members’ 
interpretations and/or analyses as such. 
 
So the upshot of Schütz and Sacks’s considerations is that we should not begin to 
move on cultural questions until we have a decent description of how they are, as 
it were, on the ground, for those on the ground themselves. What we are 
analysing (professionally) has already been analysed by those (laypersons, 
members) whose domain we are (as analysts) effectively trespassing on. And we 
can’t fudge the distinction by claiming to be a member-analysts or participant-
observers. That’s just a basic abrogation of ethics. They read/interpret/analyse 
the music as a performance. We come on the scene later. We are late. There’s no 
room in the room as we try to come in. So we have to have respect for what those 
members do; and take it that our job is to describe it — as best we can and with 
humility — as those who are already late. We have to look out in particular for 
members’ analytic methods, if we can see them at all. We have to see what we see 
there and describe them. Then we might have started to see and describe ethno 
(folk/cultural) methods. 
 
In this way, we can see that the question ‘What is culture?’ doesn’t lead us to a 
final ground of culture — a kind of Holy Grail of the human sciences since at least 
Herder (1784)xi — but rather to something like the grounds of a way of going 
about making discrete inquiries about specific kinds of cultural things (cultural Specific gravity / 14 
members’ methods) operating in specific kinds of locations. Again Wittgenstein is 
instructive: ‘Giving grounds ... justifying the evidence, comes to an end; — but the 
end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind 
of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-
game’ (Wittgenstein, 1974: §204).xii 
 
Capital-C Culture can’t be seen all at once in some transcendentally true 
proposition (as an answer to the question ‘What is culture?’); rather small-c 
cultural matters can only be grasped piecemeal in actions and their descriptions. 
In this case, all the analyst has going for her is the still arguable possibility — 
asserted by Schütz, Garfinkel and Sacks in their different ways — that in acting in 
certain ways, members display for themselves (that is they ‘interpret’, ‘account’ or 
‘analyse’) the methodicalness of their actions as part and parcel of those very 
actions.xiii And that methodicalness can be described as the most ordinary thing 
in the world. 
 
 
3. Describing local cultures’ self-analysability 
 
Let’s now look at the upshot of these methodological reflections for how they 
operate in the analysis and understanding of a particular case. In his ‘tearing 
down’ lecture, Sacks (1992: 199-203) is working with a bunch of transcribed 
materials from a therapy session for ‘delinquent’ youths in California c. 1965. This 
is a youth group sent, for all I know, to mandatory counselling for petty criminal 
activities like drag-racing in the streets, ‘acting up’, ‘being a hood’ (as they then 
called it), ‘doing resistance’ (as some now say), and showing all this and more in 
the session itself, perhaps even against the psychiatric establishment itself. For 
example, they nicely characterise those taping and, possibly, watching the session 
as nothing more important than ‘baby headshrinkers’ (Sacks 1992: 142). In fact, Specific gravity / 15 
the transcript is replete with examples of ‘interpreting’, ‘accounting for’ or 
‘analysing’ the specifics of what it is to ‘do therapy’ right there, in and as, the 
doing of the therapy session itself. So, for example: 
 
Henry:  This is an abnormal session. See we’re not together without the 
broad. 
Bob:  yeah 
Mel:  See we gotta have the broad here. Cause she unites us. 
 
 
Henry:  He [the therapist] sorta keeps his mouth shut and writes things 
down whenever you say something important 
[ Mel:  And if you ask him 
[ Henry:  He’s a good guy though 
[ Mel:  to do something then you have to pay him though 
Bob:  yeah 
Henry:  Eventually you’ll become sane. 
 
 
Joe:  hah. Hey this is the academic counselling center. It’s call the 
family,       family circle. 
Henry:  It’s not really an academic counselling center, it’s sort of a drive 
in nut house. ha ha. 
 
 
Joe:  She smokes cigars. That’s about all. ha ha. 
Mel:  They smoke. I chew them. 
Joe:  He eats it. 
Henry:   Well chewing them is half the fun – oral gratification. heh heh 
 
(All selections from Sacks, 1992: 140-141) 
 
These are plainly examples of accounting for what therapy is (for ourselves, the 
participants) during the course of (official) therapy itself. But in this lecture, Sacks 
is more interested in an earlier part of the session. Here, Bob has just been 
introduced as a newcomer to the group and the resident members announce their 
own upcoming (psycho-?) analytic work on him as follows: 
 
Mel:  Now let’s see what else can we decide about you [Bob]? 
  –>  Henry:  Hey don’t tear him down Specific gravity / 16 
Joe:  I’ve been torn down for– 
Mel:  ok 
Henry:  We got company 
Mel:  oh ok. Tell us about yourself so we can find something bad about 
you. 
(Sacks, 1992: 137) 
 
‘Tearing down’ then, we should note from the start, is not a cultural analyst’s 
category in the first place, but something cultural members (at least in this 
fragment) refer to themselves as doing. It’s a way of analysing a thing that they 
do — in and as part of ‘therapy sessions’ — which might itself also be called 
‘analysing’. And it’s interesting to note that, in the strict sense, ‘analysis’ (as in 
chemical analysis) means ‘taering down’, reducing something to its (ideally 
further-irreducible) components. So Sacks has, as he often does, hit on a certain 
territory where professional (for him mostly ‘sociological’) methods are 
secondary to — come after — (and, indeed, may be clarified by or thrown into 
some relief by) laypersons’ (members’) methods. His project in the lecture is ‘to 
ask whether that procedure which they call “tearing down” has any interesting 
relationship to what it is that at least the patient in a therapy situation takes to be 
going on, at least some of the time’ (Sacks 1992: 199). In short: Sacks is asking 
whether it’s possible to treat members as utterly distinct from being ‘cultural 
dopes’: do they (pace mainstream sociology) know how to make cultural events 
work, and also know how to show (‘account’) that capacity in and as the doing of 
the event itself? 
 
Sacks treats this instance of referring to ‘tearing down’ (from within a therapy 
session on the part of its ‘clients’) as one case of a possibly more general and 
widespread (but also materials-based) method by which ‘clients’ show that they 
know what goes on in (in this instance) therapy sessions. He parallels it with, for 
example, a practitioner beginning with ‘Tell me about your problem’ and the 
‘client’ responding: ‘I’m ashamed to. I don’t want you to tell me I’m infantile, Specific gravity / 17 
because I know that’ (Sacks, 1992: 200). As it were, the possible words of the 
therapist are already in the mouth of the client (cf. ‘oral gratification. heh heh’) 
before they can be uttered as such. To put this another way, at least this one 
member’s analysis of the utterance ‘Tell me about your problem’ consists of a 
prefiguration of a whole range of possible turns that could be its upshot and a 
plausible reason as to why those turns should not in fact be taken for, as it were, 
good therapeutic reasons. 
 
So what’s being investigated here is not just some isolated tiny fragment (‘don’t 
tear him down’) but something much richer: something that members appear to 
be able to do on much the same methodic basis across particular events. And yet, 
that methodic basis is (analytically) located only in the events themselves: ‘Don’t 
tear him down’ and ‘I don’t want you calling me infantile’.xiv This, I think, takes 
us into a possible (but quite firm) territory beyond the analysis of culture as 
somehow trickling down historically from the ‘great thinkers’ to the everyday 
world (or vice versa). Joe, Henry, Bob and Mel can be taken every bit as seriously 
as Galen, Freud, Malthus and Mill. 
 
But, since we are now in the realm of bringing famous professional ‘scientific’ 
analysis into comparison with unrecorded lay ‘folk’ analysis let’s mark the fact 
that, in his lecture, Sacks then takes a sidestep, turning to a third bit of reported 
talk, to try to get at the ‘deep problem’ involved. The third instance is, at least 
initially, counter-intuitive. He cites Ronald Berndt in Excess and Constraint: Social 
Control Among a New Guinea Mountain People. At this point in the book, Berndt 
is referring to what he and his co-investigators were taken to be by the ‘subjects’ 
of his ethnographic work: ‘We were viewed as returning spirits of the dead who 
had forgotten the tongue of our fathers and wanted to relearn it’ (Berndt in Sacks, 
1992: 200). 
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Before proceeding with Sacks’s reading of this peculiar passage, let’s note that we 
already have at least three relatively distinct but related binary collections of 
personnae operating to this point: 
  Cultural analysts : cultural members 
  Therapeutic analysts : clients 
  Anthropological analysts : subjects of investigation 
Might it then be possible that what Sacks says about the third collection could 
apply to the first two as well? We shall see. 
 
The connection is roughly this: ‘We were viewed as’ is perfectly okay; but it 
delimits what can come next. One such thing is to hear it as framing an upcoming 
translation from another language: ‘Such that, if Berndt stood up at an 
anthropological convention and said, “I, Ronald Berndt, am a returning spirit 
from such-and-such”, that would be good grounds for them to think he’s insane’ 
(Sacks, 1992: 201). The sentence then is ‘asemantic’, as Sacks says, but only if you 
can’t hear it that the second part (‘returning spirits of the dead who had forgotten 
the tongue of our fathers and wanted to relearn it’) is not in fact Berndt’s own 
professional analytic category for describing himself but a way of him trying to 
express a members’ analytic category (i.e., a category distinct from Western 
anthropological ‘science’). To cut a long story short, the distinction between a 
members’ category and any putative category from outwith one’s range of 
membership is, in itself, some members’ distinction. 
 
Or, we (assuming we are not Berndt’s New Guinea tribespeople for just one 
moment) could not do anything with a category like ‘returning spirits of the dead 
who had forgotten the tongue of our fathers and wanted to relearn it’. No 
language-game we practise could make use of any such move. That would be like 
being asked to be on the lookout for a checkmate in soccer or a three-no-trump 
bid in billiards. Specific gravity / 19 
 
Sacks contrasts the category (‘returning spirits of the dead who had forgotten the 
tongue of our fathers and wanted to relearn it’) with recently coined terms like 
‘schizophrenia’: weird and almost unusable at first — it came into European 
languages about 1910 — but now extensible to all sorts of actually encountered 
cases: 
 
... until the term ‘schizophrenia’ was invented, it could be said that we 
lacked that category, and that given it, a body of experience, a set of 
observations, etc., could now be ordered, and ‘schizophrenia’ now stand as 
their name — and be used, furthermore, as other disease names might get 
used. But what kind of experience this term ‘returning spirits ... etc.’ 
orders, and what class it would be part of is, at least to me, quite obscure. 
(Sacks, 1992: 201) 
 
Put bluntly, ‘schizophrenia’ supposedly works as a category because it has 
become — since 1910 — both (a) an accepted way of classing subordinate cases 
within its scope (individuals with recognisable symptoms) and (b) an accepted 
member of a recognised class superordinate to it (diseases). ‘Returning spirits of 
the dead’ has managed neither.xv ‘And yet’, Sacks continues, ‘there’s a sense in 
which we do understand, by some mapping, what sort of thing he [Berndt] is 
talking about. And that, of course, is an extremely interesting kind of fact’ (1992: 
201). 
 
It’s interesting because it shows that there is translatability across and between lay 
and professional domains of discourse (language-games) — ‘by some mapping’ 
— and yet there also is not. Some things get taken up easily across the domains, 
some never do. ‘H2O’, ‘Pluto’ and ‘tachycardia’ took, what?, months, less? 
‘Hegemony’, ‘transition-relevance-place’ and ‘logocentrism’ remain asemantic in 
most lay domains to this day. Other things lie in the vast space in between — 
waiting, on stand-by in limbo. At best, it can be said that there’s an always 
problematic and contingent relation between the two. Now this is a heightened Specific gravity / 20 
problem particularly when the categories in question are supposed to help us 
understand specifically cultural matters. The problem is the study of culture’s (or 
‘the human sciences’’) unique burden. And this is because of Schütz’s (previously 
discussed) distinction between first and second order constructs: human-science 
constructs are always (if they are to be meaningful at all) explicitly constructs of 
the constructs already endogenous to the various laities they would ideally 
describe, understand or explain. Hence, Sacks writes: 
 
I introduce this sort of consideration since I want eventually to make the 
case that one of the core problems for ... the social sciences in general ... 
concerns the relationship between the categories that those disciplines set 
up and the categories that members of the society otherwise use. (1992: 
201-202) 
 
This is the exact opposite of saying that lay actors are social-scientifically naive 
and that a main job of the social sciences would be to re-educate them so that they 
might one day realise their ‘real’ (scientifically proven) conditions. Rather, it is 
saying that we have barely begun to say anything yet about ‘what the structure of 
lay knowledge is’ (1992: 202). Yet, the main efforts of the social sciences, to date, 
have been geared towards assuming that that very structure is already known 
(‘after all, we’re all lay members, aren’t we?’) and needs to be replaced by 
specialist concepts. Sacks’s news is that any such enterprise is doomed to failure; 
if only for the simple reason that any such specialist concepts are always prone to 
becoming (despite professional gate-keeping strategies) just more material for 
existing lay, ordinary, ethno-methodic practices. 
 
Joe:  She smokes cigars. That’s about all. ha ha. 
Mel:  They smoke. I chew them. 
Joe:  He eats it. 
Henry:   Well chewing them is half the fun – oral gratification. heh heh 
(Sacks, 1992: 140-141) 
 
So at least one part of the problem is that: Specific gravity / 21 
 
somehow members take it that such categories — ‘manic depressive’, etc. 
— are additions to a list of categories that exist already, and can be used in 
just the same fashion that old ones are usable. They may be better, but they 
do not otherwise modify the structure of the class, of which people come to 
be seen as members. However, the professional constructing these new 
categories may take it that one major task he has is to somehow build them 
so they are unusable in the way that the categories he sees them as 
replacing were usable. That is, the professionals put it as a programmatic 
task that they would like to have it that the statement ‘You’re a manic 
depressive’, for example, would be nonsense in ordinary English, i.e., 
unless said by a therapist. (Sacks 1992: 202; emphasis added) 
 
Sacks’s point is born out by the fact that, as I write — nearly 40 years later — 
‘manic depression’ has been given over completely to the laity, while 
professionals, at least for now, prefer ‘bi-polar depression’. Something else will 
probably be next — we await the DSM-V with anticipation.xvi 
 
But a second part of the problem is perhaps more important for our still elusive 
question: what is culture? Sacks, that is, tells us that professional terms ‘do not 
otherwise modify the structure of the class, of which people come to be seen as 
members’. He is, of course, pointing to members’ own methods of classing or 
categorising themselves which, on empirical inspection of actual cases, turn out to 
be extremely complex methods that a rough concept like, for example, ‘ideology’ 
could never even begin to imagine, let alone describe. To expand this, we might 
say that no professional conceptualisation can have much effect as far as on-the-
ground members’ actional methods are concerned.xvii So, it’s not just that the 
investigation of culture (whether in sociology, anthropology, literary studies, 
cultural studies, or whatever) can easily do without a certain philosophy of the 
human sciences which insists on the central idea that ‘technical findings stand in 
some position of replacement to lay findings’ (Sacks, 1992: 202). More 
importantly, this kind of self-importance which has bolstered the relentless search 
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the human sciences, has been at the expense of and deflected attention from the 
main concern that has been staring us all in the face to start with: small-c 
culture(s) as the indefinitely inventive and manifold ordinary methods members 
use for producing and sustaining local orders of everyday affairs. 
 
 
4. Empirical examples of ‘culture’ at work 
 
In this final section, and in accord with the speculations above, I want to offer a 
tentative analysis of a collection of actual empirical fragments. Over the last 
decade or so, I have been transcribing perspicuous cases of the use of the term 
‘culture’ occurring in popular texts. There has been no exact method to the 
collection itself; rather, in the spirit of Sacks, I have assumed that if there is order 
to be found, it is as discoverable in any fragment as it is in some statistically 
derived ‘sample’. (On the sampling versus the ‘order-at-all points’ view of local 
cultures, see Sacks 1992: 484.) The whole collection is now quite large but shows 
some surprisingly methodic properties. Not all of these can be analysed here, but 
at least the basic flavour of them can be sketched. Here are some of my materials 
then with the relevant usages ino bold: 
 
(1) 
Despite typical flat pragmatism from Scully (Gillian Anderson), who sniffs 
at a culture obsessed by media and the chance for self-dramatisation, 
Mulder persists in seeking a monster he has heard about from locals. 
‘The case of the monochrome monster’, Who Weekly, 9 March 1998: 71. By 
line: Gerri Sutton. 
 
(2) 
In the US, anti-consumerist activists argue that ‘branding’ (such as Ikea, 
The Body Shop, Reebok, Starbucks) creates a kind of fake culture, one 
defined by corporations instead of the ups and downs of real life and 
culture. 
‘Domestic Harmony’, The Weekend Australian, 8-9 September 2001: 52. By 
line: Rosalie Higson. 
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(3) 
Having departed Teesside amid acrimony over claims of a drinking and 
gambling culture, the England midfield player now says Villa manager 
John Gregory is failing to understand his problems as a recovering 
alcoholic. 
‘Merson threat to leave Villa’, The Weekend Australian, 16-17 January 
1999: 49. By line: Richard Hobson. 
 
(4) 
... the Western cultural pattern that assigns things masculine to the 
cultural and things feminine to the natural. 
Student essay, 2000. 
 
(5) 
In the history of culture the discovery of zero will always stand out as one 
of the greatest single achievements of the human race. 
‘Much ado about nothing’, Australian Review of Books, 5(4), May, 2000: 18. 
By line: Peter Slezak. Slezak is quoting a quotation from Danzig (1930) in 
Seife (2000: 12). 
 
 
So, we have to ask, what kind of ordinariness are these instances of ‘culture’ 
accomplishing? Let’s turn to the first example and think about the expression ‘a 
culture obsessed by media and the chance for self-dramatisation’. The kind of 
work that ‘culture’ is doing here appears to be directed towards a highly general, 
almost miasmic, ‘mentality’ inhabiting a very broad population: perhaps even as 
broad as ‘the West’. But how it predicates that non-specific population in order to 
‘get at’ its mentality is to suggest that its main point of contact with ‘the real’ is an 
equally non-specific institution called ‘the media’. Moreover, the goal or end of 
that ‘obsession’ is ‘the chance for self-dramatisation’. There are several possible 
readings of this phrase. 
 
On the one hand, we may immediately think of Andy Warhol and the supposed 
fifteen minutes of fame that anyone might (as it were, accidentally) have. In this 
case, the ‘media obsession’ is an actual possibility — realisable in the form of, for 
example, reality TV. The character of Scully in The X-Files is then seen to be Specific gravity / 24 
turning away, on her own account, from the possibility of (albeit brief) fame, 
though acknowledging that her ‘subjects’ in this episode are seeking after just that 
form of glory. 
 
On the other hand, we may take ‘self-dramatisation’ as a more local possibility. 
On this view of things, mediatisation simply means that we falsely think and act 
like famous persons (stars) and are, to that extent, engaged in false consciousness. 
Instead of Warhol’s pictures, we now get pictures of a person acting locally but 
out of character, outside the ‘realistic’ assessment of others in the same locality. 
They therefore appear to be ‘jumped up’, ‘putting on airs and graces’, and the 
rest. 
 
There are a number of other readings of this usage of ‘culture’, but the two we 
have for now will suffice to show that ‘culture’ can (and routinely does) take us 
into a realm of fantasy — as in non-reality, unscientific thought, delusions of 
where and what one actually is; and such that the ‘actuality’ is given by another 
and more logical and grounded system of thought: ‘flat pragmatism’. In this way, 
it becomes possible for the concept of ‘a culture’ to do importantly negative moral 
work, to become something that a pragmatist quite reasonably and rationally 
‘sniffs at’. 
 
But then we could point to the context of this snatch of discourse: it’s a review of a 
TV program in a popular magazine. In this sense it’s an instance of the very moral 
problem Scully is supposed to be dealing with ‘inside’ the reviewed episode of 
The X-Files. Whichever way we turn, then, this version of culture as (non-
scientific) illusion comes back to haunt us. 
 
Our second example in some senses reiterates this mobilisation of culture. ‘Fake 
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dramatisation’. The moral parallels are easy to draw. The sense of not being true 
to one’s authentic self is not far from the imagination in both cases. The 
opprobrium of being ‘obsessed by media...’ and the acceptance of one’s own 
indulgence in ‘fake culture’ are clearly related. But what of ‘real life and culture’? 
Now culture seems to have been put on to another footing altogether — and by 
contrast with the ‘fake’. The work that ‘culture’ is doing here is to reinscribe moral 
authenticity. It brings the thing down to the everyday level, associating it with 
‘real life’. And that ‘real life’ has it ‘ups and downs’, which (‘fake’) culture 
presumably does not. 
 
So then we have to ask: how is it that ‘culture’ can be mobilised in such opposite 
ways in the same sentence? What kind of thought could permit such distinct 
usages? And the only possible way through the maze is to say that ‘culture’, 
culturally, can easily switch values as the ‘thought’ goes along. Rosalie Higson 
has said/written something that is both utterly illogical and also totally 
understandable at the same time. The (proto)logic of cultural thinking obviously 
needs to be worked out as a topic in its own right. 
 
In the third example, we find ‘culture’ being used in a much more localised way. 
Gone are intimations of the West as a whole and of its mass (false) mentality. But 
the negative moral possibilities are still with us. This ‘culture’ is now confined to a 
specific region of the UK, Teesside in the north east, used perhaps as a metonym 
for Middlesbrough, the main port city and home to Paul Merson’s former football 
club. The rather nice work that ‘a ... culture’ does here is to distance Merson from 
personal responsibility for his (then?) notorious indulgences in drinking and 
gambling. It shifts the locus of the predicates ‘drinking’ and ‘gambling’ away 
from a person (Merson) and places them more nebulously in the locality that the 
person happened to inhabit at the time. The possible accounts that could easily 
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culture: ‘Teessiders drink and gamble’ — though, to be sure, the generalisation to 
the region as a whole is mitigated by the word ‘claims’; and the term ‘acrimony’ 
does put the ball somewhat back into Merson’s own penalty area. With this 
mitigation in place, the report is then able to make a nicely balanced claim of its 
own: that Merson, at his new club, Aston Villa, has become — or is he merely 
saying he has become? — a victim, a recovering alcoholic. If the former, we are 
asked to find blame with ‘a culture’. If the latter, we make a judgement about the 
man himself. 
 
‘A culture’, then, can do some quite fine moral work: the work of displacement. 
Just as a lawyer may defend an accused person on the basis that they were once, 
in the past, themselves victims of injustices — hence explaining, if not excusing, 
their transgressions — so imbrication in ‘a culture’ can become a defence in its 
own right. The idea of a culture then becomes finely powerful: it can turn one 
who is otherwise a complete reprobate into a (now) misunderstood and 
misplaced ‘mere member’ of a larger constituency of wrong-doers. Still, the 
negative moralisation of anything called ‘a culture’ persists. 
 
In some respects, I’m at a loss to account for our fourth example. When I first read 
this phrase, as one who had to mark the essay in question, I wondered how 
anyone could think such a thing. How could the word ‘cultural’ be used in such 
different ways in, as it were, the same breath. Without thinking? Without noticing 
the difference? But on reflection, it turns out that this difference is thinkable and 
that it’s not much different from my own (non-trivial) version of the culturality of 
culture. At that point, the interpretation is simple: there’s a Western (cultural?) 
distinction between nature and culture with the former being associated with 
(assigned to?) the feminine and the latter with the masculine. N : F :: C : M? So 
what is the greater ‘C’ (culture/cultural pattern) that relies on the very equation 
of N:F::C:M itself? It’s a distinct possibility for the term ‘culture’ without Specific gravity / 27 
contradiction, but only if we now return (as with our first example) to a 
generalised culture of the ‘West’ (that is, still without hypothesising a capital-C 
Culture pertaining to all humankind) and try to argue, as this essay does, that it 
makes the masculine its preferred norm. (And note that Laqueur depends on a 
reverse claim: that, in the one-sex system, it is the male body that is the natural 
template.) 
 
On this version of things, a culture, Western culture, becomes something like a 
family hierarchy, with patriarchal inheritance values: the passing on of its own 
‘pattern’ from father to son, but skipping mothers and daughters. The latter then 
are relegated to cultural inferiority (possibly even exclusion) by being ‘assigned’ 
to culture’s standard opposite, nature. 
 
Again, though — and for all the differences between this and the two previous 
cases — we need to note how the term ‘culture’ is being mobilised to accomplish 
negative moral implications. On the surface of the phrase we have a mere 
‘pattern’ that assigns things of a certain type to one domain, and things of the 
opposite type to another. It looks like a logical proposition. But it’s impossible not 
to hear the different values being ascribed to such a division. And how we hear 
this is precisely because of the double use of the term ‘cultural’. That is, the 
student is rehearsing the logical technique sometimes called the ‘court of last 
return’. 
 
To put this simply: if we have a division or dispute between x and y — e.g., 
between the executive and the judiciary — which of the two has most authority to 
decide the matter? And the answer depends on whether the division is an x- or a 
y-based division. Is the division between executive and judiciary an executive or a 
juridical division? That will tell you where, in the last instance, the dispute should 
be resolved — by an administrative body or in the courts. The same applies here Specific gravity / 28 
and the argument goes that the nature/culture division is finally a cultural one; 
with the secondary implication that the M/F division is a masculine one and, 
moreover, that it’s directly mapped on to the first division. You don’t have to 
agree with this to see the ultimate strength of the argument, or to see the 
trenchantly moral complaint it makes via the surface form of an apparent 
tautology (or, more strictly, a pleonasm). 
 
Our fifth example takes us to that version of culture which has so far failed to 
emerge in our sample: capital-C Culture. Here we have a historian of mathematics 
pronouncing on something called ‘the history of culture’ which is rendered as 
roughly equivalent to the ‘achievements of the human race’, no less. What we 
notice immediately, in this case, is not only the absence of moral opprobrium but 
its exact inversion. This culture cannot, by contrast with our other cases, be 
‘obsessed’ or ‘fake’. It could never be a culture of ‘drinking and gambling’. Nor 
can it be a ‘cultural pattern’ that is designed for negative outcomes such as 
privileging one gender over another. Instead, we find in this culture all that is 
eternal, noble and good: something working disinterestedly (or perhaps in 
everybody’s interests alike), located in the abstract and the global, and moving 
towards perfectibility rather like the Hegelian Geist. We hear that among its 
candidate paradigmatic expressions is nothing less than the discovery of zero: the 
mathematisation of nullity itself. 
 
What we can derive from these examples is a number of initial and highly 
tentative hypotheses about the ordinary everyday mobilisation of the concept of 
culture. I want to end by suggesting that the further testing of these hypotheses 
could form the analytic core of a relatively unique way of understanding and 
analysing culture. Such a proto-discipline would be highly specific in its 
orientation to the close analysis of ordinary (non-spectacular) naturally-occurring 
materials and its central problematic would shift from asking what culture is, to Specific gravity / 29 
asking what kinds of work culture does, in and as the actual working of the 
concept, for everyday members accomplishing such work. The five hypotheses 
would be: 
H1.  ‘Culture’ functions culturally to do moral work of various, indefinitely 
many, and locally specific kinds. 
H2.  It is not itself a moral category as such; rather it works to show that its 
predicates (‘drinking’, ‘gambling’, ‘obsessed by media’, ‘fake’, etc.) are to 
be heard in terms of moral value rather than, say, descriptively.xviii 
H3.  The predominant case is ‘culture’ being mobilised to do negative moral 
work. (‘A ... culture’, ‘A culture of ...’, ‘The cultural pattern that ...’.) 
H4.  Exceptional predications also exist which can do positive or neutral moral 
work. (‘Culture’ = ‘Real life’.) But these need to be explicitly marked 
against the predominant case (H3). 
H5.  ‘Culture’ (as opposed to ‘a culture of ...’ and the rest), if hearable as a 
general human capacity — via close contextual equivalences or semi-
equivalences (‘the ... greatest achievements of the human race’) — can 
achieve highly positive moral work upon its predicates. (‘Culture’ includes 
‘the discovery of zero’.) 
None of this precludes the possibility that, as an ordinary everyday object, 
‘culture’ can do all sorts of other kinds of work. However, at first blush it looks as 
if an analytic attention to its various possibilities vis-à-vis specifically moral work 
(of several kinds) in local sites presents an opening on to a distinctive study of the 
concept of culture’s own unique culturality. 
 
 
Endnotes 
i.  As Kendall and Wickham (2001: 2) note in their own excellent argument on 
behalf of cultural specificity, the 1951 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 
contains no less than 78 definitions of the term ‘culture’. 
ii.  See Harvey Sacks on ‘doing being ordinary’ (1984). Specific gravity / 30 
 
iii.  Wittgenstein is in fact quoting St Augustine in this paragraph: ‘quid est 
ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicares velim, nescio’. 
(What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know. If asked to explain, I do not 
know.) 
iv.  I’m insisting here on both abstraction and massification as constituting the 
problem in combination. ‘Cheese’ can be, and ‘concrete’ almost always is, ‘mass’ 
— but both are concrete rather than abstract. When I prevaricate over the noun 
‘concrete’, I’m allowing for the possibility of there being highly-skilled 
tradespeople who routinely distinguish one concrete from another and speak 
accordingly. That is, they do not resort to count + mass combinations like ‘types 
of concrete’, etc. They are concrete buffs, just as there are cheese buffs who must 
have distinct cheeses — not mere varieties of (mass) cheese. 
v.  The distinction between knowing how and knowing that can be found in 
both Heidegger and Ryle. Ryle may have come across it in Heidegger, having 
been one of the first English reviewers of Being and Time in the original German. 
vi.  Heidegger (1982: 17) writes: ‘And so as soon as valuative thought emerged, 
there came — and still comes — the empty talk about the “cultural values” of the 
Middle Ages and the “spiritual values” of antiquity, even though there was 
nothing like “culture” in the Middle Ages nor anything like “spirit” and “culture” 
in ancient times. Only in the modern era have spirit and culture been deliberately 
experienced as fundamental modes of human comportment, and only in most 
recent times have “values” been posited as standards for such comportment. It 
does not follow, of course, that earlier periods were “uncultured” in the sense that 
they were submerged in barbarism; what follows is that with the schemata 
“culture” and “lack of culture”, “spirit”, and “value”, we never touch in its 
essence the history, for example, of the Greeks’. Eagleton (2000: 26) writes more 
succinctly of the Victorians: ‘It is unlikely that [they] thought of themselves as a 
“culture”’. 
vii.  Alan Sobel’s (2003) critique of Laqueur’s position is, accordingly, 
devastating. See in particular his section on Laqueur’s ‘self-referential shot to the 
foot’. 
viii.  Garfinkel (whose work we will soon encounter) often refers to the 
wonderfully apt idea of catching the work of fact-production in flight. 
ix.  Again, see Sobel’s (2003: n4) remarkable footnote on Laqueur’s assertion 
that the clitoris was ‘discovered’! 
x.  See, for example, Style (1928). Specific gravity / 31 
 
xi.  Herder, one of the first to use the term ‘culture’ in a way Europeans would 
easily recognise today, is often thought to be the founder of cultural pluralism 
(though not quite relativism). What this account sometimes forgets is that, in his 
Ideas or Reflections (1784), Herder only embraced pluralism as a default: once his 
ur-anthropological search for cultural universals proved to be a failure. And even 
at this point Herder argues that cultures are different because of the distinct but 
relatively fixed material conditions — in the form of landscape, climate, etc. — 
that ultimately determine them. Herder, that is, has a generalist theory of cultural 
plurality. 
xii.  The original has: ‘Die Begründung aber, die Rechtfertigung der Evidenz 
kommt zu einem Ende; — das Ende aber ist nicht daß uns gewisse Sätze 
unmittelbar als wahr einleuchten, also eine Arte Sehen unsrerseits, sondern unser 
Handeln, welches an Grunde des Sprachspiels liegt’. 
xiii.  For a highly lucid explication of this aspect of everyday sense-making 
(‘reflexivity’), see Sharrock (1995). 
xiv.  That such fragments as ‘don’t tear him down’ are part of a ‘population’ of 
such utterances, all of which get very much the same work done, is important for 
two reasons. (1) ‘Representative sampling’ or statistical aggregation becomes 
redundant because (2) cultures display ‘order at all points’ — rather in the way 
that holographs can be completely reconstructed from tiny fragments of their 
original contents. On the methodological importance of Sacks’s unique fragment-
culture position, see McHoul and Rapley (2001). 
xv.  ‘Schizophrenia’ may be an unfortunate counter-example for Sacks to light 
upon here. Throughout his lectures he does tend towards as an acceptance of psy-
complex terms as both scientifically sound and more-or-less absorbed into 
everyday practice as being the case. Other writers such a Boyle (1990) have quite 
different accounts and tend to read categories like ‘schizophrenic’ either as on a 
par with ‘returning spirits of the dead’ or as even less comprehensible than it. 
xvi.  The promised 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the 
American Psychiatric Association. The currently effective edition is APA (1994). 
xvii.  Gramsci is often reported (perhaps unduly anecdotally) to have become 
disillusioned with the classical Marxist concept of ideology because it assumed 
that, if you told people about the real economic conditions of their enslavement to 
capital, they would, as reasonable beings, rise up against those conditions. Having 
sold this message for quite some years, he got his result: not a socialist revolution 
but Mussolini. This is then supposed to have led to a reconsideration of ideology 
(re-badged as ‘hegemony’) whereby the famous ideas of the ruling class were Specific gravity / 32 
 
now assumed to be so ingrained into ‘common sense’ as to be outwith the reach of 
rational calculation. What both concepts fail to encompass is that quotidian 
occurrences (from boiling eggs to world wars) are not to be grasped via 
exogenous technical concepts. Rather, they are methodically produced and 
achieved by the local (endogenous) productional cohorts responsible for them: 
but such that the actual (‘lay’) methods in question are a necessarily missing topic 
for almost every technical (Garfinkel would say ‘classical’ or ‘formal’) analysis. 
xviii.  ‘Predicate’ and ‘predication’ are not used here in their formal logical or 
grammatical senses. For that to be the case, we would sometimes have to perform 
certain transformations on the natural-language examples we find in routine 
discourse. For example we would have to transform the phrase ‘a drinking and 
gambling culture’ into the proposition ‘The culture [subject] is one of drinking 
and gambling [predicate]’. So it’s a kind of sub-hypothesis to our projected proto-
discipline that culture is primary and that what it acts upon are its predicates. Specific gravity / 33 
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